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Abstract
The aim of this work is to assess the trade impact of preferential schemes. It focuses on the controversial
case of the trade preferences in agriculture and fishery granted by the European Union (EU) to the Southern
Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) over the period 2004-2009. The analysis presents several methodological
improvements on previous works. Firstly, we rely on a continuous treatment - i.e. preferential margins
- to capture the “average treatment effect” of trade preferences, rather than on a binary treatment based
on dummy variables. Secondly, we apply a non-parametric matching technique for continuous treatment -
specifically, a generalized propensity score matching (GPS) technique - to assess the average causal effects of
preferences on trade flows. Thirdly, we use highly disaggregated data at sectoral level in order properly to
evaluate the preferential treatment, which is conceived to be applied at the product level. The results show
that the impact of the EU preferences in agriculture and fishery granted to SMCs is significant on SMCs
trade flows and that is better evaluated by using impact evaluation techniques. Our findings raise important
issues for policy-making by mitigating the claimed efficiency of the EU trade policy in the Mediterranean
area.
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1. Introduction
In the past two decades, the number of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) has increased more than
four-fold, to around 300 active agreements today. Nearly all countries are currently members of at least one
PTA. Most PTAs now cover a wide range of issues besides tariffs, including services, investment, intellectual
property protection, and competition policy (WTO, 2011).
Since the seminal work of Viner (1950) the effects of PTAs on international trade have been extensively
studied. Standard gains from trade have been traditionally associated with the notion of trade creation,
while the discriminatory nature of PTAs has been associated with trade diversion. Most of the literature
agrees in finding positive effects of PTAs on trade flows among members (e.g. (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007,
2009; Magee, 2008)); some works highlight trade diversion effects on non-member countries (see (Trefler,
2004; Romalis, 2007; Carre´re, 2006; Lee and Shin, 2006)); a few studies find inconclusive evidence (see, for
example, (Calvo-Pardo et al., 2009; Freund, 2010)). The most recent empirical evidence of the effects of
PTAs on trade suggests more cautious optimism. Fugazza and Nicita (2013) highlighting the importance
of the relative (vs. absolute) market access conditions, demonstrate that the current system of preferences
is characterised by lower relative preferential margins for member countries and a higher deterioration of
market access conditions for non-members. In the same vein, Cirera et al. (2011) suggest a very small
impact of the EU Generalised System of Preferences on exports from developing countries, and a negligible
or even negative one when they consider the scope for trade diversification. Finally, Hoekman and Nicita
(2011) suggest that the effects of relative preferences for low-income countries are on average very small and
preferences are more important on a country by country basis. The heterogeneous outcomes of the above
empirical studies are normally linked to heterogeneity in samples, time periods, model specifications and
PTA characteristics (Foster et al., 2011). However, also within the context of the EU-MED partnership, the
empirical evidence from the applied literature remains ambiguous (see (De Wulf and Maliszewska, 2009) and
(Jarreau, 2011) for a survey).
Our aim is to provide conclusive evidence on the causal impact of trade preferences by focusing on the
controversial case of the impact of trade preferences in agriculture and fishery granted by the European Union
(EU) to the Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) via the new generation of the EU-MED Association
Agreements (AAs) in the time period 2004-2009 (i.e. from the end of the 12 year transitional period for the
majority of AAs to the eve of the economic and political turmoil in the area). Differently from previous
literature, we believe that focusing on a single specific preferential scheme is much more informative than
relying on world averages and provides a more accurate and detailed analysis of the functional form of
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the empirical relationship, better controlling for unobservable counfounders. Moreover, our analysis presents
several methodological improvements on previous empirical works. Firstly, we rely on a continuous treatment
- i.e. preferential margins - to capture the “average treatment effect” of trade preferences, rather than on
a binary treatment based on dummy variables. This provides clear advantages: the continuous treatment
variable controls for heterogeneity in the depth and coverage of the EU preferential regime across products and
countries, as well as for the actual rate of preference utilisation. To this end, we use highly disaggregated
data by products. Secondly, we apply non-parametric matching techniques for continuous treatment to
assess the average causal effects of preferences on trade flows, thereby addressing the issue of endogeneity
between PTAs, trade flows and their determinants. More specifically, we apply the generalized version of the
propensity score matching technique, i.e. the Generalized Propensity Score (GPS). This estimates treatment
effects conditional on observable determinants of “treatment intensity”. Non-parametric matching techniques
help to isolate the treatment from any other event specific to the country pairs, and they also take into account
the presence of non-linearities in the relationship among preferences, trade flows and the covariates (Baier
and Bergstrand, 2009; Montalbano and Nenci, 2014). GPS, in particular, enables us to present a dose-
response function and to illustrate how bilateral trade flows at the product level actually respond to changes
in continuous treatment within the treatment group. In this case, the advantage is twofold: we are not
compelled to undertake the difficult task of constructing a control group with similar characteristics - which
is mandatory with the binary treatment matching techniques - and we address empirically the awkward issue
of preferences’ utilisation and the relative impact of trade preferences characterised by different intensities.
The GPS method has been recently applied to various impact evaluation problems lacking experimental
conditions: e.g. the impact of labour market programmes (Kluve, 2010; Kluve et al., 2012), regional transfer
schemes (Becker et al., 2012), foreign direct investments (Du and Girma, 2009), and also the relationship
between migration and trade (Egger et al., 2012). To the best of our knowledge this is the first application
of GPS to the assessment of the trade impact of the EU-MED preferential policy.
Our paper assesses the functional form of the relationship between the EU preferences and SMCs trade
flows to the EU. The results show that the impact of the EU preferences in agriculture and fishery granted to
SMCs is significant on SMCs trade flows and that is better evaluated by using impact evaluation techniques.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly summarises the literature; Section 3 reports some
stylised facts on the EU-MED partnership; Section 4 presents the GPS estimator; Section 5 describes the
variables and data; Section 6 shows the empirical results; Section 7 concludes.
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2. Literature review
Two main methodological approaches are commonly applied in order to measure the impact of preferences
scheme on trade flows: computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to quantify the impact ex ante, and
gravity models to measure it ex post.
Both static and dynamic effects have been considered in recent CGE studies on economic integration (see,
among others, (Lee and van der Mensbrugghe, 2008; Bouet et al., 2008). The static model evaluates the one-
off, more immediate impact of the removal of trade barriers (Gilbert et al., 2001; Urata and Kiyota, 2005).
The dynamic model incorporates medium-term to long-term efficiency gains from resource reallocation and
capital accumulation (Cheong, 2003; Francois and Wignaraja, 2008). Yet these models have been criticised
because PTA results have been shown to be particularly sensitive to assumptions on the trade elasticity
(Brown et al., 1992; Ackerman and Gallagher, 2008), and a further limitation of CGE models is their poor
economic interpretation of trade policy effects because of their structural complexity and data requirements
(Panagariya and Duttagupta, 2001).
In the gravity approach, the effect of trade agreements is usually estimated by including dummy variables
to control for the presence of policy factors and assess the extent to which PTA partners trade more than
would be predicted by standard bilateral trade determinants. The “dummy strategy” is in fact the most
workable solution. But it is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons: it implicitly assumes equal treatment
and does not control for gradual implementation of the agreements; it does not control for specific country
pair events contemporaneous with PTAs; it is unstable and loses significance the more that heterogeneity
in the model is controlled for. This strand of the empirical literature typically focuses on either the EU
or the USA preferences schemes (see, among others, (Acharya et al., 2011; Agostino et al., 2007; Caporale
et al., 2012; Collier and Venables, 2007; De Benedictis et al., 2005; Di Rubbo and Canali, 2008; Frazer and
Van Biesebroeck, 2010; Mart´ınez-Zarzoso et al., 2009; Pe´ridy, 2005; Nilsson, 2007; Nilsson and Matsson,
2009)). Other studies apply a continuous variable by computing various measures of ”preferential margins”
guaranteed by a country to its partners (Aiello and Demaria, 2010; Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010; Francois
et al., 2006; Hoekman and Nicita, 2011; Kee et al., 2009; Low et al., 2009; Nilsson and Matsson, 2009;
Montalbano and Nenci, 2014). Most of the works that employ a dummy variable conduct empirical analysis
on aggregate data, while papers that employ continuous variables focus on disaggregated data.
Because a PTA is not an exogenous random variable but it is likely to be endogenously determined
by and correlated with the country-pair trade flows and its determinants (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007;
Egger et al., 2008), several authors have recently addressed the endogeneity issue by relying on the impact
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evaluation methods and, in particular, using non-parametric matching techniques based on the benchmark
between treatment and control groups. Persson (2001) has been one of the first to adopt this technique.
In his work he uses non-parametric matching estimators to estimate the effects of a common currency on
trade. He provides alternative estimates of the treatment effect more robust to selection and non-linearities
than the linear regression strategy previously adopted. More recently, Egger et al. (2008) have applied a
difference-in-difference analysis based on matching techniques to estimate the impact of endogenous new
regional trade agreement membership on trade structure within the OECD economies, finding a strong
effect of these agreements on intra-industry trade. The analysis of Baier and Bergstrand (2009) provides
the first nonparametric empirical estimates using matching econometrics of the cross-sectionally long-run
effects of free trade agreements on members’ trade volume. They find a narrower range (across years) and
more economically plausible values of the long-run effects of free trade agreements on members’ trade than
parametric ones in cross-section.1 Millimet and Tchernis (2009) use propensity score-matching estimators
to assess the environmental effects of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization
membership and the impact of adopting the euro on bilateral trade, finding respectively that the WTO is
beneficial for environmental measures and that the euro has a positive effect on bilateral trade. Recently,
Montalbano and Nenci (2014) have presented non-parametric matching estimates assessing the trade policy
impact of the EU-MED free trade area; Cooke (2013) adopts a matching framework to estimate the impact
of the AGOA policy of the USA on the exports of the beneficiary countries; Egger et al. (2012) use a semi-
parametric approach to evaluation of the functional form of the relationship between migration (stocks) and
trade (bilateral imports).
Our aim is to contribute to this strand of the empirical literature by applying a generalized version of
the propensity score matching technique to estimate the impact of EU preferences regarding SMCs trade,
conditional on observable determinants of “treatment intensity”.
3. The EU-MED preferential trade policy: stylised facts
About twenty years since the launch of the Barcelona Process, SMCs are today fully involved in the
EU-MED partnership, except for Syria (including the Palestinian Authority which has an Interim Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreement, see Table A.1 in the Appendix).
1Baier et al. (2013) confirm the above evidence on using also a gravity equation of both intensive and extensive margins
and employing a long panel dataset with a large number of country pairs, product categories (4 digit SITC) and economic
integration agreements. They carry out a set of robustness checks to potential country-selection, firm heterogeneity and reverse
causality.
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The objective of the network of bilateral AAs between EU member countries and SMCs is to provide
for the gradual establishment of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area (FTA) in accordance with the rules of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). It foresees the free movement of goods between the EU member
countries and SMCs with the gradual removal of customs duties after a transitional period of twelve years
following the entry into force of the AAs. As a result, since 1995, SMCs have recorded a dramatic decrease
in Most Favored Nations (MFN) customs duties (below 18 percent for agricultural products and 5 percent
for non-agricultural products) (Femise, 2011).
While all SMCs industrial goods are currently EU duty free, a quite new trade liberalization process
is currently in place in the agricultural sector2. In all SMCs, agriculture plays a major role and is a key
resource for the long term sustainability of economic development. By contrast, agriculture is a relatively
small sector in the EU economy: it accounts for only 1.1 percent of GDP and 5.1 percent of employment
(Tangermann and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2013). Nevertheless, the political weight of the agricultural sector
is still remarkable, since it represents about 25 percent of the value of agricultural production in Spain,
Italy, Greece, Portugal, Malta and Cyprus (E.C., 2003). Also testifying to the political importance of
agriculture is the EU’s relatively high level of protection for the agricultural sector, as well as its considerable
heterogeneity. The EU protection is mainly characterized by: tariff-rate quotas, seasonal quotas and tariffs,
threshold prices (Chevassus-Lozza et al., 2005), and it varies markedly among different products (Jacquet
et al., 2007). Liberalisation between the EU and SMCs in the agricultural and food processing sectors was
initially partial. However, a widening of the scope of the agreements to include greater liberalisation in the
agricultural, agro-food and services sectors, as well as a reduction in non-tariff barriers (NTBs), is currently in
progress (Jarreau, 2011). Although broad agricultural liberalisation still lags behind, some products already
benefit from preferences granted within the framework of preferential agreements: more than 80 percent of
agricultural products imported from the Mediterranean countries now enter the EU market either duty free
or at reduced rates. Reciprocally, one third of EU exports of agricultural products benefits from preferential
treatment in the Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, a system of Pan-Euro-Med cumulation of origin -
also covering agricultural and fishery products - operates between the EU and SMCs. 3
2Liberalization of trade in services and investment, including the right of establishment, is also part of the Association
Agreements’ key objectives, as well as the establishment of bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms for trade matters.
3In July 2011 the 42 members of the EU-MED partnership adopted the “PanEuroMed Protocol on cumulation of origin”,
which allows economic operators to cumulate processing made in different countries of the region and thus obtain preferential
treatment. This Pan-Euro-Med cumulation is based on a network of preferential agreements that define the preferential tariffs,
sometimes awarded for a limited volume (within quotas). The tariff reduction and hence the preferential margin enjoyed by the
countries varies considerably within these quotas.
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Notwithstanding the on-going liberalisation process, trade between EU and SMCs is still largely asym-
metric. While 95 per cent of EU agricultural and fishery imports comes from outside SMCs, for the majority
of SMCs the EU is the key destination market for their agricultural and fishery exports (more than 70 per
cent of agricultural and fishery exports in the case of Algeria, Israel, and Morocco, more than 50 per cent
for Tunisia). Moreover, as is apparent from Fig. A.1 in the Appendix, since the Barcelona Declaration,
EU-MED trade relations have increased in absolute terms but worsened relatively to the other EU main
trade partners4. Should we conclude that EU trade preferences are not effective? The question is not a
trivial one. If we compare the EU preferential margins granted to our sample of products originating from
SMCs before and after the entry into force of each respective EU-SMCs AA, apparent is not only a reduction
in the mean level of protection but also a reduction in their heterogeneity minimum/maximum levels, as
well as in their dispersion around the mean measured by standard deviation (see Figs. A.3 and A.4 in the
Appendix). However, if we plot the mean value of exports by product before and after the entry into force of
each respective EU-SMCs AA, a high degree of heterogeneity is still apparent (see Figs. A.5 to A.11 in the
Appendix). While on average some products actually increase their exports to the EU market, other prod-
ucts reduce their mean export value towards the EU. The impression is that the impact of EU preferences
is not unambiguous.
4. The GPS estimator
The GPS estimator - originally proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2004) and Imai and van Dyk (2004) -
is a generalisation of the binary treatment propensity score. It is a non-parametric method used to correct
for selection bias in a setting with a continuous treatment by comparing units that are similar in terms
of their observable determinants of “treatment intensity” within the treatment group. Hence, it does not
require control groups. It is based on the following assumptions: for each i there is a vector of covariates
Xi, a ”treatment” received, Ti ∈ [t0, t1] and a potential outcome, Yi = Yi(Ti). Following Hirano and Imbens
(2004) we assume: Yi, Ti and Xi are defined on a common probability space; Ti is continuously distributed
with respect to a Lebesgue measure on τ ; Yi = Yi(Ti) is a well defined random variable. For each i we
postulate the existence of a set of potential outcomes, Yi(t), for t ∈ τ where τ is the interval [t0; t1] referred
to as the unit-level dose-response function. We are interested in the average dose-response function across all
observations i that illustrates the expected value of the outcome variable conditional on continuous treatment
4To highlight the different performances of SMCs and CEECs, in the figure we adopt the EU15 group instead of the EU27
one as in the empirical analysis.
7
as follows:
D(t) = E[Y i(t)] (1)
In this exercise we use index i = 1, ..., N to indicate the 6-digit products traded from SMCs to the EU27
area and assume the unit-level dose-response of potential outcomes in terms of EU bilateral imports, Yit
as a function of the treatment t ∈ τ , where t is the product-level preferential margin granted by the EU.
Following Hirano and Imbens (2004), we define GPS as:
R = r(t,X) (2)
where R is the propensity score, i.e. the conditional probability of receiving a specific level of treatment
given the covariates, and which is estimated via the following standard normal model:
R̂i =
1√
2piσ̂2
exp
[
− 1
2σ̂2
(ti − β̂0 −Xβ̂1)2
]
(3)
The main purpose of estimating GPS is to create covariate balancing. However, the validity of R as a measure
of similarity or dissimilarity across product-level observations depends crucially on the validity of a set of
assumptions which are standard in impact evaluation literature. The first assumption is the randomness of
the treatment, i.e. the “unconfoundedness” or “ignorability of the treatment”. This means that, conditional
on observable characteristics, the treatment can be considered as random. Unconfoundedness is a key
assumption in analysing trade preferences since countries sharing preferential agreements are unlikely to be
randomly chosen (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Egger et al., 2008). Imbens (2000) shows that if the treatment
assignment is weakly unconfounded given the observed covariates, then the treatment assignment is weakly
unconfounded given GPS. In other words, the GPS has the following property:
X⊥1 {T = t} |r(t,X)(4)
Another common assumption is the “overlap assumption”, i.e., the need to maintain an adequate balance of
observations between treatment and control groups. Using GPS we can easily get rid of it since we do not
rely on control groups but instead work across GPS strata of various “treatment intensities” on a continuous
distribution. Another assumption is the “unique treatment assumption” which is ensured in this case by
the high degree of standardisation of the EU AAs. Last but not least we should take account of the “non-
interference assumption”, i.e., possible biases in the relationship between treatment and outcomes due to
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interfering events, such as the standard “trade diversion” effect in PTAs. Since our focus is on assessing the
impact of the EU preferences on SMCs export flows, our analysis is not affected by the likely trade diversion
of non-member countries to the EU. On the other hand, the small shares of SMCs exports on EU imports
across products actually reduce also the relevance of trade diversion from SMCs (the SMCs product shares
higher than 10% of the EU imports are only 4% of total observations, see Fig. A.2 in the Appendix). A
robustness check that omits those observations in the empirical analysis is provided in section 6.5
GPS removes the bias associated with differences in covariates in three steps. In the first step, the
GPS is estimated and its balancing property checked. If balancing holds, product-level flows within GPS
strata can be considered as identical in terms of their observable characteristics, independently of their
actual level of treatment.6 Then, two additional steps are needed to eliminate the bias associated with
differences on the covariates (see Hirano and Imbens (2004) for a proof). The first one is estimation of
the conditional expectation of the outcome as a function of two scalar, the treatment level T and the GPS
R, β(t, r) = E[Y |T = t, R = r]. The second and final step is to estimate the average dose-response function
(DRF) of the outcome (product-level SMCs exports to the EU) averaging the conditional expectation over
the GPS at any different level of EU product-level preferential margins, as follows:
D(t) = E[β(t, r(t,X))] (5)
Furthermore, we can estimate the varying marginal effects of the treatment by estimating the treatment
effect function, which is the first derivative of the corresponding dose-response function.
5. Variables and Data
In this exercise we use three different sets of data: the 6-digit product level preferential margins applied
by the EU to the SMCs (i.e., the treatment, Ti); the observable characteristics which explain the probability
of reaching a specific level of preferential margin (Xi); and the outcome in terms of export flows from SMCs
to the EU at the 6-digit product level corresponding to the level of treatment received (Y (t)). Table A.2 in
the Appendix reports a full description and the sources of the data applied in our empirical exercise.
5It is worth noting that in our case the presence of trade diversion among SMCs would eventually reduce the estimated
causal impact of EU-MED AAs on SMCs trade flows to the EU.
6Note that as long as sufficient covariate balance is achieved, the exact procedure for estimating the GPS is of secondary
importance (Kluve et al., 2012).
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Regarding the continuous variable for the actual product-level preferential margin granted to SMCs in
the framework of the EU-MED AAs, we apply here the following measure of preferential margin (PM):
PMjit =
∑
v
TEUvit ∗ impEUvit∑
v
impEUvit
− TEUjit with v 6= j (6)
where T is the minimum tariff applied by the EU to imports of product i7 and imp are the EU bilateral
imports. i indexes the HS 6 digit categories; j indexes SMCs while v indexes the exporters competing with
country j to access the EU market; t stands for observed years. While the second term (TEUjit ) is simply the
minimum tariff applied by the EU to imports of product i from country j, the first term is the counterfactual.
The use of the counterfactual acknowledges the fact that for a given country it is the relative preference (i.e.,
the market access conditions relative to those faced by foreign competitors) that matters, not the absolute
one, especially in the case of EU, because of the proliferation of EU PTAs around the world. It builds on
the arguments put forward by Low et al. (2009); Carre´re et al. (2010); Hoekman and Nicita (2011) and it is
computed as the trade weighted minimum tariff level that the EU imposes on all other countries except j for
which the preferential margin is calculated. Weights are the EU bilateral imports of product i from countries
v, so as to take into account the supply capacity of SMCs competitors to the EU market. To mitigate the
endogeneity problem we keep trade weights fixed over time in all the observed years (2004-2009) by taking the
average values 1996-2003 of the EU bilateral imports. The PMjit provides the relative advantage of SMC j in
product i and year t with respect to each trading partner, capturing the discriminatory effects of the overall
EU-MED system of preferences. Hence, it provides a reliable measure for the actual differences in EU market
access both among SMCs - within the EU-MED AAs framework - and between SMCs and trade competitors
eventually joining other PTAs with the EU. Moreover, the use of the applied tariffs controls directly for the
actual utilisation rates of preferences, while the product level analysis controls for heterogeneous preferences
on different products’ origins. PM could be positive or negative depending on the advantage or disadvantage
of the SMCj in product i for each year t with respect to all the other competing exporters to the EU.
It varies between the maximum negative bias (i.e. being the only trading partner facing tariffs when all
other exporters enjoy duty free access) and the maximum positive bias (i.e., being the only trading partner
enjoying duty free access while all other exporters face MFN tariffs). PM is zero when is no discrimination
(i.e. the EU applies identical tariffs across all trading partners including duty free access). To be noted is
7This tariff rate is equal to the MFN applied tariff unless a preferential tariff exists in the database.
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that the use of PM resolves a number of weaknesses of the simple dummy strategy. Firstly, it allows us to
rely on a continuous measure of trade preferences. Secondly, it considers both the presence of differentiated
treatments in the EU-MED framework and the issue of the gradual implementation of the EU-MED AAs.
But it has drawbacks as well: it does not take into account the restrictive effects on non-tariff measures; and
it takes into account only the direct price effects of tariffs, ignoring the general equilibrium of cross price
effects (Fugazza and Nicita, 2013).
The issue of the covariates able to explain the probability of reaching a specific level of preferential margin
is a controversial one. As stated by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), PTAs may well be a response to, rather
than a source of, large trade flows, giving rise to endogeneity bias in trade impact evaluations. By introducing
asymmetric absolute and relative factor endowments into a Krugman-type increasing-returns/monopolistic-
competition model, they present, theoretically and empirically, the following determinants of the likelihood
of bilateral PTAs: countries’ economic size, distance, trade similarity and relative factor endowments.8
Following the early literature on the sectoral determinants of trade protection after Finger (1981), Olarreaga
and Vaillant (2011) explore the role played by microeconomic and macroeconomic variables in explaining the
determinants of temporary trade barriers at the product level for Brazil. The price and value of imports at the
product level are the main macroeconomic determinants that they use. Furthermore, to control for the role
played by other microeconomic determinants pertaining to political economy (such as the concentration of the
sector, output, or the extent to which workers are unionized), they use fixed effects and time varying effects.
Among macroeconomic determinants they focus on MFN tariffs, real bilateral exchange rates (as a measure
of competitiveness), and traditional measures such as the level of economic activity, unemployment, and
institutional changes. Karacaovali and Limao (2008) emphasize the role of political economy, together with
more standard economic variables, such as trade elasticity, market access, world price, and scale economies.
Lastly, Gawande et al. (2011) underline the influence of both political economy variables (such as WTO-bound
tariff, import demand elasticity, output-to-import ratio), and trade and product specialization measures
(such as intra-industry trade, intermediate output, vertical specialization) in explaining the (weak) demand
for protectionism.
In this empirical exercise we control for the actual determinants of preferential margins by assuming three
main channels of impact. The first channel controls for country and product specific characteristics as well
as time variant events in determining likely sources of protectionism. To this end, a full set of countries, time
8Baier and Bergstrand (2004) correctly predict, solely on the basis of economic characteristics, 85 percent of the 286 FTAs
existing in 1996 among 1431 pairs of countries and 97 percent of the remaining 1145 pairs with no FTAs.
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and products fixed effects as well as the HS6 digit EU import demand elasticities have been considered. To
be noted is that in the period of observation there were no time-variant political and/or economic occurrences
able to determine a shift in EU trade policy towards SMCs (both the political turmoil widely known as the
“Arab spring” as well as the economic consequences of the recent financial crisis actually occurred after the
period of analysis). Furthermore, in the same period the SMCs under analysis did not register any change
in PTAs with other trade partners that could influence their trade flows with the EU.9 The second channel
controls for the role of ad valorem equivalents of quotas or other nontariff barriers (NTBs) seen as possible
substitutes for preferences. Finally, since there is little scope for intra-industry and vertical specialisation
in agricultural and fishery trade, we control for trade specialisation by relying on simple measures of SMCs
trade specialisation, as well as EU import penetration by product. Moreover, as suggested by Baier and
Bergstrand (2004), we also control for the GDPs difference between trading partners, since the probability
of a PTAs is higher, the more similar they are.
As a measure of trade specialisation we apply the absolute and relative 10 product-level Lafay index as
follows:
Ljit =
xjit −mjit
xjit +m
j
it
−
∑
i
xjit −
∑
i
mjit∑
i
xjit +
∑
i
mjit
 ∗
 xjit +mjit∑
i
xjit +
∑
i
mjit
 ∗ 100 (8)
This index measures country j’s level of trade specialisation or revealed comparative advantage for each
year t as the contribution to the trade balance of each product i to overall exports of country j. To
acknowledge the meaning of the index, note that if there were no comparative advantage or disadvantage
for any industry i, then country j’s total trade balance (surplus or deficit) should be distributed across all
industries according to their share in total trade. The ’contribution to the trade balance’ is the difference
between the actual and this theoretical balance. Hence, a positive contribution is interpreted as a ’revealed
comparative advantage’ for that industry. The advantage of using this index lies in its ability to derive a
workable measure of each country’s comparative advantages as they are revealed in trade data, avoiding
difficulties linked to quantitative evaluations of factor-endowments and relative prices. Of course, decisions
9The only exceptions were Lebanon and Tunisia, which joined EFTA during the period of analysis. However, after controlling
for this, the empirical results do not change.
10The relative version of the product-level Lafay index is:
Lijt =
xjit −mjitxjit + mjit −
∑
j
xjit −
∑
j
mjit∑
j
xjit +
∑
j
mjit
 ∗
 xjit + mjit∑
j
xjit +
∑
j
mjit
 ∗ 100 (7)
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about preferences are not driven exclusively by the revealed comparative advantages. There are a number
of issues, mainly outside the field of economics, that can have a role in determining a specific preferences
structure, also relative to other preferential schemes. To take these largely unobservable issues into account,
here we also apply a set of country, year and product specific fixed effects to control for all unobserved
determinants of PM .
Our outcome variable is the exports flow in agriculture and fisheries from SMCs to the EU disaggregated
by export countries, products and year. In this exercise we use HS classification at the maximum disaggre-
gation available (6 digit). Hence, we take into account agricultural, food and fishery products listed under
chapters 1 to 24 of the Harmonized System Code (HS), Sections I-IV. To link products and tariffs properly,
we use the WITS-TRAINS dataset. Since the aim of our empirical exercise is to examine whether the effect
of the change in tariffs is stronger, the greater the advantage that it provides relative to other competitors,
the choice of the time span (from 2004 to 2009) has been determined by the timetable of the transitional
period of 12 years after the entry into force for most of the EU-MED AAs. The decision to limit the time
period to 2009 also keeps the analysis out of the incidence of the both political and economic turmoil that
has occurred in SMCs in the most recent years.
The complete dataset from 2004 to 2009 includes 1865 observations.11 However, two more sample re-
strictions are applied. First, we eliminate those observations which can be considered as ’duty free access’
cases (i.e. when both the counterfactual and the minimum tariff applied by the EU are equal to zero) or
where corresponding data on covariates are not available. Second, we eliminate the observations in the first
and the last 5 percentiles of the preferential margin distribution in order to clean our dataset of potential
outliers. These two restrictions leave us with 1218 observations.
6. GPS estimation and results
6.1. GPS estimation and balancing property
The first step of our impact evaluation exercise is to estimate the GPS and test the “balancing property”.
The joint Jarque-Bera normality test does not reject the null hypothesis of normal distribution for the
treatment variable.12 Table 1 presents the outcomes of the first stage equation. The selected covariates prove
to be important determinants of selection into treatment intensities across products and SMCs, including the
11It includes the available data on both trade flows and tariffs at 6-digit product level for our sample of countries.
12We apply here a zero-skewness Box-Cox transformation of the treatment variable. The p-value is equal to 0.11, above the
5% threshold of significance.
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series of fixed effects previously described. The absolute Lafay index of the EU is positive and significant.13
It indicates that the greater the contribution to the EU trade balance of a specific sector, the higher the
probability that SMCs have a positive preferential margin within the EU’s overall preferential scheme. Since
here we are using a relative measure of preferential margin rather than the absolute one, it shows that, at a
certain level of the protection of its products of relative specialisation, the EU prefers SMCs to their main
competitors. Conversely, both the absolute Lafay index of the SMCs and the relative Lafay index between EU
and SMCs are not significant.14 This empirical evidence suggests that the EU-SMCs preferential scheme is
mainly driven by the EU’s trade policy strategy. Also the GDP coefficient is robust even if slightly positive.15
The average EU import demand elasticity has a positive sign and it is highly significant. It shows the EU’s
relatively higher propensity to prefer SMCs for those products whose trade volumes are more sensitive to
price variations. Finally, the positive sign and significance of the NTBs coefficient confirm the hypothesis
of substitution between NTBs and tariffs. They empirically highlight the EU’s strategy to maintain higher
preferences in the sectors characterised by relatively higher quotas or other non-tariff measures.
Notwithstanding the relevance of our set of covariates, to be noted is that, in impact evaluation exercises,
the interpretation and statistical significance of the individual effects of the covariates are of less importance
than obtaining a powerful GPS (i.e., a GPS that works well in balancing the covariates by respecting the
condition in eq. 4). In this regard, it is not irrelevant to add that the R-squared of our first stage regression
is high and consistent with similar GPS empirical exercises (Becker et al., 2012; Serrano-Domingo and
Requena-Silvente, 2013).
Following the approach of Egger et al. (2012), we test the balancing property by comparing the covariates
across groups with and without the GPS correction. Hence, we first perform a series of two-sided t-tests
across groups for each covariate.16 Groups of approximately the same size are formed on the basis of the
actual preferential margin intensity, i.e. low (group 1); medium (group 2) and high (group 3). We obtain
an average t-stat of 1.25. In 15.2% of the cases (119 over 783), the t-stat rejects the null hypothesis of
equal mean among covariates, highlighting the presence of selection bias in the data. In order to remove
this unbalance, as in Egger et al. (2012) and Becker et al. (2012), we exploit the results in the first stage
13Three lags of the Lafay index have been considered sufficient in this empirical exercise to avoid endogeneity problems.
14It is worth noting that removing the products where SMCs show higher revealed comparative advantages, the relative Lafay
index becomes more robust, showing that the EU preferences are higher on the products where SMCs are less specialised (see
Table A.4 in the Appendix).
15This result is consistent with Baier and Bergstrand (2004) because we use here the real GDPs of SMCs instead of the
difference between them and that of the EU since in this case the EU GDP is a constant.
16This entails a remarkably high number of tests to be performed (261 variables for three groups, i.e. 783 t-tests), including
fixed effects.
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Table 1: Generalised Propensity Score Estimation
coef SE (robust)
EU Lafay Index 496.421*** 204.83
SMC Lafay Index 1.265 3.31
EU-SMC Lafay Index -0.030 0.035
GDP 0.001** 0.000
EU imports demand elasticity 0.131*** 0.132
EU average non-tariff barriers 2.491** 1.179
Cons 1.623 2.684
SMCs Dummies Yes 15.82***
Year Dummies Yes 3.19***
6-digit product Dummies Yes 694.64***
Observations 1 218
R squared 0.49
Note: In bold the results of the Wald tests for joint significance of the three groups of dummies.
All time variant variables with three lags.
estimation (Table 1) to calculate the probability of each trade flow having the median preferential margin
of the group T jM (for j ∈ 1, 2, 3), i.e. R̂i(T jM , Xi). We then plot these GPS values in group j against those
not in group j (see figs. from A.12 to A.17) and eliminate those observations in groups other than j that lie
outside the common GPS support. This means that we drop those trade flows in the control groups (blue
bars) which lie outside the range of the treatment group (red bars), keeping only those flows which respect
the following condition:
MinR̂i(T
j
M , Xi) ≤ R̂l(T jM , Xl) ≤MaxR̂i(T jM , Xi) (9)
for i ∈ j and l /∈ j.
The common GPS support condition is respected by 1085 observations out of 1218 used in the first stage,
while 133 trade flows are pruned in order to ensure comparability among groups. We then organise the data
in a group-strata structure to test the balancing property. This enables us to compare observations between
treatment groups across strata based on the estimated GPS, i.e. to control for the ex-ante probability of
receiving a specific preferential margin. For each of the three groups, six strata are determined on the basis
of GPS scores evaluated at the median preferential margin of the respective group. We impose the same
structure on the control observations in the same strata but in different groups. Table A.3 reports the final
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group-strata structure of the data.
To finalise the test of the balancing property, we again perform a series of t-tests comparing the mean
difference in all the covariates among trade flows belonging to the same strata but in different groups (see
Table A.5 in the Appendix). For example, we compare the trade flows belonging to Strata 1/Group 1 with
the observations in Strata 1/Control 1. For each group, we then calculate the mean t-statistics weighting
the t-stats by the number of trade flows in each stratum. After controlling for the GPS score, the average
t-stat drops to 0.34 in the post-conditioning scenario. The number of cases where the t-stat rejects the null
hypothesis of equal mean diminishes from 119 to 2. This means that our pre-treatment variables are well
balanced among groups, confirming that the balancing property assumption holds and selection bias has
been removed.17
6.2. Empirical results and robustness check
The last step of our empirical analysis is to estimate the DRF, i.e. to assess the level of SMCs’ agriculture
and fishery exports to the EU at any specific level of the observed preferential margin, given the estimated
GPS. The GPS terms in this regression controls for selection into treatment intensities, while the interaction
term shows the marginal impact of the treatment relative to the GPS. If selectivity matters, we expect both
the GPS and the interaction coefficients to be statistically significant. This means that the GPS method
highlights possible bias in outcomes that are actually controlled by looking over GPS strata, as well as across
GPS by using the interaction term.
A number of polynomials can be tested to assess the above relationship. As in Egger et al. (2012) we
chose to disregard polynomial terms that turned out to be insignificant.18 The corresponding results for
the parsimonious, semi-parametric DRF are summarised in Table 2. As emphasised by Hirano and Imbens
(2004), similarly to what occurred in the first stage case, the parameters reported in Table 2 do not have
a causal interpretation. Also in this case R-squared is relatively high, given the parsimonious specification,
and consistent with similar GPS empirical exercises.
The key findings of Table 2 is that selection into treatment intensities is relevant in the EU-MED case.
The GPS coefficient is positive and significant and the marginal impact of treatment intensity decreases
along with GPS intensities, as shown by the negative sign of the interaction term coefficient.
The upper panel of Fig.1 reports the graphical representation of the point estimates of the DRF while
17We tested the balancing property for different group/strata structures. The results confirm that the preferred structure
performs best in balancing the data.
18Other polynomial specifications neither add any relevant information nor affect the DRF.
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Table 2: Dose-Response Function estimation
Coef SE(robust)
PM 0.190*** 0.066
PM2 0.024*** 0.002
PM3 -0.001*** 0.000
GPS 303.265*** 32.571
GPS2 -5145.429*** 1100.752
GPS3 29235.28*** 9113.825
GPS ∗ PM -6.024*** 0.972
Observations 1 047
R-squared 0.80
Figure 1: The dose-response and the treatment effect function
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the lower panel of Fig. 1 represents the treatment effect function (TRF), i.e. the first derivative of the DRF.
The dashed lines are the corresponding 90% confidence intervals based on estimated bootstrapped standard
errors. The upper panel of the figure shows the non linear relationship between the product level preferential
margin granted by the EU in agricultural and fishery products and the respective level of SMCs exports
to the EU. It is positive and increasing until it reaches the optimal level, which corresponds to neutrality.
Then, positive EU preferences do not have an impact on SMCs’ exports until they reach a very high level
(i.e., over 5). This is the key features of our empirical analysis and the most important issue for policy-
making. Consistently, the TRF in the lower panel of Fig.1 shows that the marginal change of SMCs exports
in correspondence to a marginal change of the EU’s preferences increases when the level of preferences is
heavily negative, then decreases towards neutrality and increases again only from very high levels of EU
preferences.
Table 3: Dose-Response Function estimation (product shares on the EU imports less than 10%)
Coef SE(robust)
PM 0.136** 0.068
PM2 0.022*** 0.002
PM3 -0.000*** 0.000
GPS 312.925*** 31.336
GPS2 -5458.23*** 1047.38
GPS3 30885.39*** 8574.10
GPS ∗ PM -5.143** 1.011
Observations 983
R-squared 0.80
To avoid potential bias that may derive from trade diversion among SMCs - i.e., lower estimated impacts
of preferences caused by diverted trade flows from the most relevant SMCs competitors - we perform the
same exercise by dropping the SMCs products whose shares on EU imports are higher than 10% (which are
supposed to be more affected by trade diversion). As is evident from Table 3 and Fig.2 there is no material
difference in the empirical outcomes.19. The only noticeable difference between the two estimations is that
in the latter one the optimal treatment is even lower with respect to neutrality.
7. Conclusions
The most recent debate on PTAs has focused on the following research question: do preferences impact
on trade? While the common perception is that preferences do impact positively on trade, the empirical
19Due to space constraints the first stage outcomes are presented in Table A.4 in the Appendix
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Figure 2: The dose-response and the treatment effect function (product shares on the EU imports less than 10%)
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evidence is debated. The issue is becoming controversial within the framework of the EU-MED PTAs,
since trade relations between EU and SMCs have worsened relatively to the EU’s other main trade partners
since the Barcelona Declaration. The aim of this work has been to assess the trade impact of EU-MED
preferential schemes in agriculture and fishery by adopting a novel methodological approach, namely a GPS
matching technique. Differently from the majority of current analyses, we chose a continuous variable to
measure preferences in order to capture the ”average treatment effect” of PTAs. Second, we applied non-
parametric matching techniques for continous treatment to assess the average causal effects of preferences
on trade flows. Third, we used highly disaggregated data at sectoral level in order properly to evaluate
the preferential treatment which is conceived to be applied at the product level. Our paper has assessed
the functional form of the relationship between EU-SMCs preferences in agriculture and fishery products
and bilateral trade flows with continuous treatment under the (weak) unconfoundedness assumption. Our
empirical results show that the impact of the EU product-level preferential policy on SMC trade flows in
agricultural and fishery products is significant, and that is better evaluated by using impact evaluation
techniques. They also suggest that while the removal of a relative disadvantage in terms of trade preferences
has, on average and ceteris paribus, a positive effect on trade flows, positive preferences do not have a
positive impact on trade until they reach a very high level (over 5). These findings raise important issues
for policy-making mitigating the claimed efficiency of the EU trade policy in the Mediterranean area.
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Appendix A.
Table A.1: State of implementation of EU-MED AAs
Country Signature date Entry into force
Algeria 22 April 2002 1 September 2005
Egypt 25 June 2001 1 June 2004
Israel 20 November 1995 1 June 2000
Jordan 24 November 1997 1 May 2002
Lebanon 17 June 2002 1 April 2006
Morocco 26 February 1996 1 March 2000
Palestinian Authority 24 February 1997 1 July 1997 (Interim association agreement)
Syria Negotiations concluded awaiting for signature
Tunisia 17 July 1995 1 March 1998
Turkey 6 March 1995 31 December 1995
Table A.2: Variables and data sources
Type Variable Source
Outcome variable Export flows in agriculture and fisheries (Chapters 1 to 24 of the HS code, Sections I-IV) BACII-CEPII
Treatment variable Preferential margin (the 6-digit product level applied tariff) WITS-TRAINS
Covariates:
Institutions/political economy Countries, time & products fixed effects; EU Import demand elasticities (HS6) Kee, Nicita & Olarreaga, RES 2008; 2009
Trade specialisation Absolute and relative Lafay index; GDPs difference UN-COMTRADE; Penn World Tables 6.1
NTBs Ad valorem equivalents of quotas or other nontariff barriers Kee, Nicita & Olarreaga, RES 2008; 2009
Table A.3: The final group-strata structure
Strata Control1 Group1 Control2 Group2 Control3 Group3
1 382 56 276 69 473 57
2 166 56 116 68 127 57
3 97 55 84 69 66 56
4 52 56 80 68 42 57
5 34 56 74 69 23 57
6 20 55 44 68 14 56
Total 751 334 674 411 745 340
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Table A.4: Generalised Propensity Score Estimation (product shares on the EU imports less than 10%)
coef SE (robust)
L.EU Lafay Index 482.131** 190.494
L.SMC Lafay Index 0.649 3.677
L.EU-SMC Lafay Index -0.042 0.052
LnGDP 0.002*** 0.000
EU imports demand elasticity 0.045*** 0.013
EU average non-tariff barriers -1.232** 0.547
Cons. -5.674** 2.737
SMCs Dummies Yes 14.73***
Year Dummies Yes 4.01***
6-digit product Dummies Yes 771.11***
Observations 1 114
R squared 0.50
Note: In bold the results of the Wald tests for joint significance of the three groups of dummies.
All time variant variables with three lags.
Table A.5: Differences in treatment levels before and after balancing on the GPS: t-stats for equality of means.
Prior to balancing on the GPS After balancing on the GPS
Covariates Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
EU imports demand elasticity 1.313 2.755 1.458 0.603 0.623 0.228
EU average non-tariff barriers 1.577 1.308 2.905 0.268 0.714 0.410
EU Lafay Index 2.874 1.565 4.479 0.475 0.201 1.639
SMC Lafay Index 2.144 0.599 1.539 1.009 0.473 0.240
EU-SMC Lafay 1.108 0.085 1.194 0.341 0.015 0.529
Real GDP 7.418 3.675 3.593 0.070 0.458 0.338
Mean t-value 1.250 0.337
Nr. unbalanced obs 119 2
Note: t-values reported in bold face indicate null rejections at the 5% level significance.
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Figure A.1: EU Trade with its main partners (1996-2009)
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
Figure A.2: EU imports share from SMCs in agricultural and fishery products
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
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Figure A.3: EU preferences towards SMCs (mean stdev min max)(before AA entry into force)
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
30
Figure A.4: EU preferences towards SMCs (mean stdev min max)(after AA entry into force)
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
Figure A.5: SMCs external trade: before and after AA Entry into force
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
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Figure A.6: SMCs external trade: before and after AA Entry into force
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
Figure A.7: SMCs external trade: before and after AA Entry into force
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
32
Figure A.8: SMCs external trade: before and after AA Entry into force
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
Figure A.9: SMCs external trade: before and after AA Entry into force
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
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Figure A.10: SMCs external trade: before and after AA Entry into force
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
Figure A.11: SMCs external trade: before and after AA Entry into force
Source: Authors’ own calculations on Comtrade
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Figure A.12: Common support of GPS B1
Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure A.13: Common support of GPS A1
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Figure A.15: Common support of GPS A2
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Figure A.16: Common support of GPS B3
Source: Authors’ calculations
Figure A.17: Common support of GPS A3
Source: Authors’ calculations
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